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Abstract
Introduction
The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) was launched in India in 2005 to address the
health needs of under-served populations in rural areas, and to support universal access to
care. Despite this initiative, unaccredited informal providers (IPs) often remain patients’ first
point of contact, which has led to inconsistencies in treatment, and has compromised the
quality of care.
Aim
To explore the factors that influence patients’ decisions about healthcare providers in rural
areas of central India.
Methods
Nine focus group discussions (FGDs) were held in nine villages in central India. Framework
analysis using an inductive approach was used to analyse the data.
Results
The crosscutting theme across the discussions was not choice but need—the need for
affordable and accessible health care regardless of the provider’s qualification. Results
highlighted that IPs play a pivotal role in villagers’ lives. Formal healthcare services were
accessed infrequently, and mainly when a condition was judged severe or possibly even
fatal. Even then, affordability was carefully weighed. Villagers’ distance from formal provid-
ers contributed to high cost and low preference of formal providers. When opting for IPs,
familiarity and trust were more important to villagers than qualifications. IPs have operated
in rural communities in India for a long time and have adapted their services to meet the
needs, preferences, social norms, and economic conditions of villagers.
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Conclusion
IPs have captured a niche and are often the first contact point in rural settings even when
patients ultimately are diagnosed and treated by trained doctors. Merely tackling the under-
supply of qualified doctors is not effective or sufficient to impact on the rural healthcare sys-
tem: the strong and prevalent influence of IPs needs to be addressed also.
Introduction
Universal health coverage (UHC) was recognized as a goal for healthcare systems globally in
1978 [1] and was further affirmed by the sustainable development goals [2]. UHC implies equi-
table access to key healthcare services, including promotive, preventive, curative and rehabili-
tative health interventions at affordable cost to all [3]. In India, The National Rural Health
Mission was launched in 2005 to support this, and improve access to public health care ser-
vices, especially for the underprivileged population [4]. The three-tier system of public health
care services consists of sub-centres, primary health centres (PHCs), and community health
centres (CHCs). There are approximately 23,458 PHCs and 4,276 CHCs in the country. How-
ever, human resources in the public healthcare sector are scarce: 18.8% of PHC and 51.8% of
CHC doctor positions remain unfilled [5]. Approximately 74% of medical graduates offer ser-
vices to 28% of the country’s population, mostly comprising affluent families in urban settings
[6]. Qualified or formal providers (FPs), those recognized by a government-affiliated regula-
tory body, are often unwilling to practice in rural health centres [7]. Therefore, despite the
National Rural Health Mission, the public health system in India has consistently fallen short
of almost all its goals, including quality of care, and physical accessibility of services, especially
for rural residents for whom most care is provided by non-qualified persons [4,8]. Those for-
mal health services that are available in rural areas are reportedly nonresponsive to people’s
needs [9].
Given the challenges listed above, informal practitioners (IPs), practitioners who have some
level of informal training but are not registered as healthcare workers nor formally accredited
[10], have become the principal health care providers in rural areas of India [11]. IPs include
traditional birth attendants, spiritual leaders, unqualified doctors and unqualified doctors [9].
IPs are different from community health workers (CHWs) and accredited social health activ-
ists (ASHA) where the latter interacts with the rural population through a government sup-
ported platform and acts as liaison between individual and government health facilities.
Though it is widely known that IPs are the first point of contact for many rural patients, there
is no formal mechanism of getting information about the exact number of IPs in India, nor is
there a database of how many providers are currently active in different parts of India. How-
ever, according to available reports, IPs constitute approximately more than half of all active
providers in rural India [12] and they are often the first point of contact when residents have
health problems [5]. Despite being legally prohibited from practising, a census of providers in
rural Madhya Pradesh revealed the existence of 12 times more IPs than FPs [13]. As much as
77% of rural health care services are provided by IPs in the central Indian state of Madhya Pra-
desh [14]. This is a problem for population health as the untrained and entrepreneurial IPs
cannot provide the same quality of health services as FPs [15]. Studies reporting on the training
of IPs to improve their provision of care suggests that training can improve rates of correct
case management but has only limited impact on correct medicine prescription [13].
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An argument could be made that IPs proliferate in rural areas because there is demand for
their services. However, there are few investigations of why villagers, who are often underprivi-
leged, opt for IPs. This information is key to designing and improving the rural health services
and to inform health care delivery for underserved populations [16] in India and other low-
and middle-income settings. This paper aims to understand what influences decisions about
choosing healthcare providers (IP or FP) among rural residents in India.
Methods
This is a qualitative study using focus group discussions (FGDs).
Study setting
This study was conducted in the Ujjain district of Madhya Pradesh state, India. Ujjain is one of
51 administrative districts and has a population of 1.9 million people [17]. The human devel-
opment index (HDI) of Madhya Pradesh is 0.557, and it is ranked 20th among 29 states and 7
union territories in the country [18]. Approximately 49% of Ujjain’s population live below the
poverty line [19], as compared to the Indian average of 21.2%. The sex ratio in the district is
968 females per 1,000 males [20]; the maternal mortality rate is 176 per 100,000 live births, and
the infant mortality rate is 54 per 100,000 live births [21], which is worse than the country
average. The population density is 326 people per square kilometre. The literacy rate is 72.3%
[17]. The health system in Ujjain is made up of the public and private sector. In total, 56.0% of
all health care providers in Ujjain are IPs, with more IPs present in rural areas [18].
Participants, sampling and data collection
Purposive sampling was used for selecting the site and the participants. The study was con-
ducted in rural demographic surveillance site (DSS) of R D Gardi Medical College, Ujjain. R D
Gardi Medical College has been providing health care services to this area for more than 15
years through its rural health centre and also through its network of village health workers.
The medical college has built a rapport with the community through its health services
programs.
Initially 12 villages were randomly selected out of sixty villages in the DSS to carry out the
FGDs. We sought to understand the situation of deciding about health providers in a variety
of settings, and therefore conducted FGDs in different villages in 2014. We randomly selected
20 households in each village. Local health workers visited the chosen households to inform
about the study and invited one adult household member for the FGD. Participants were
included if they, or a family member, had visited a health care practitioner at least once in the
30 days preceding the FGD date.
We used a piloted semi-structured topic guide to conduct the FGDs. It was prepared based
on a review of literature, and covered the domains of health-seeking behaviour, approaching
IPs, factors influencing patient choices, and IPs’ attributes (Appendix A). The FGDs were car-
ried out in a regional dialect in which both the participants and the data collectors were well
versed. Each FGD consisted of between seven and 12 participants. The sample size was
informed by data saturation, as we conducted analysis during data collection. After the ninth
FGD we found that no new themes were emerging, and closed sampling. Two FGDs were con-
ducted by female moderator with groups of women; seven were conducted by male moderator
(VD) with groups of men. Each FGD lasted between 45–60 minutes and was audio-taped (see
Table 1 for participant characteristics). The researchers also took detailed notes to facilitate
transcription of the recordings. The participants were given light refreshment after the FGDs.
No other incentives were offered to study participants.
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Data analysis
Transcription was done in Hindi and the content was translated into English by VD and
research assistants. Data analysis was conducted inductively, concurrently with FGDs and
sampling continued until data saturation. We used framework analysis to analyse the data
[22]. The approach involves reading and familiarising with the data, coding, creating a frame-
work from these codes and finally charting the data onto the framework. Two authors (GA
and VD) analysed the data independently, and differences were resolved through discussion.
The authors then presented the data to the rest of the research team for agreement and refine-
ment where necessary.
Ethical considerations
The study was approved by ethics committee of R. D. Gardi Medical College, Ujjain, India
(reference number 351, December 4, 2013). Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants included in the study prior to the start of the FGDs. Permission was also sought
from participants for recording the FGDs.
Results
The main, crosscutting theme across the interviews was not choice, but need–the need for
affordable and accessible healthcare, regardless of the provider’s qualifications. We expand on
this theme below.
Ubiquitously available informal providers ease access to healthcare
IPs are more readily accessible in rural areas than qualified doctors. Some IPs had worked or
had been working for qualified doctors in the urban areas, and according to participants they
practiced relying on their gained knowledge and experience. While FPs were available only
during the day, IPs were also available at night:
“We have a compounder [a person who mixes medicines] here who goes to Ghosla in day
time. At night, we take medicine from him”
(FGD2, Male 4)
There were far more IPs in the villages when compared with FPs. Some pharmacists acted
as IPs, dispensing medication for ailments, and villagers also had access to traditional
Table 1. Characteristics of FGD participants.
FGD no Type No of Participants Age Range
(years)
Number of years of schooling
(Mean years ± SD)
1 Male 8 22–28 8.1±2.9
2 Male 10 32–41 6.1±3.9
3 Male 12 46–65 5.0±4.2
4 Female 8 35–50 2.8±3.2
5 Male 7 22–29 7.7±2.0
6 Male 10 34–50 9.9±2.3
7 Male 10 18–33 7.5±3.7
8 Male 8 45–66 4.5±4.0
9 Female 8 20–29 4.5±4.0
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220316.t001
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Ayurveda providers. However, in these rural villages qualified doctors and/or health facilities
either did not exist at all or were perceived by participants as inadequate for their needs. For
example, the provider’s gender was important for particularly women participants–they noted
their preference for, and a shortage of, qualified female doctors in rural areas.
Participants also spoke of not visiting formal providers because they could not get there–
there was insufficient transport available to travel outside the village and the travel would take
a lot of time. This was closely linked to the overall issue of cost and affordability, described
below. IPs tended to practice inside the villages, where qualified doctors were reluctant to
open their clinics. Thus, for most villagers, the nearest health provider was an IP. Sometimes,
IPs were also willing to make house calls, easing access barriers further:
“Even if there is some emergency at night, they [local IPS] will readily wake up and treat the
patient. If we take the patient to their place, they would treat and if we call them home, they
would come home and treat”
(FGD 1, Male 3)
However, even in those villages where government and charitable hospitals were available
within reasonable distance, the participants reported avoiding going there because they found
the prospect of having to deal with non-cooperative government hospital administrators
unpleasant. Some participants also reflected on the importance of connections to receive good
treatment. Reflecting on the scarcity of qualified doctors at tertiary care government hospitals,
respondents also reported that such facilities had long waiting times, which was not conve-
nient for them. Several respondents also said that in their opinion, doctors at charitable hospi-
tals, such as those at the medical college, spend too much time in making a diagnosis, whereas
IPs were ready to give treatment after a shorter period of investigation. IPs were therefore per-
ceived a better choice, as they mostly lived close to the patients, were available more quickly,
offered flexible hours, and had a readily available stock of medicines. These factors were seen
as speeding up interactions to receive treatment.
IPs are more affordable and offer flexible payment—Easing the burden on
low income patients and increasing access
Affordability was a key issue behind participants’ decisions about different providers.
While IPs readily worked on credit or even on a barter system, which was convenient to villag-
ers with low incomes, qualified doctors required upfront payments even before they saw
patients:
“One of the other reasons for choosing local doctor [IPS] is financial problems because in vil-
lages we don’t always have money. We are all depended on agriculture and there is no regular
income. So, for primary treatment, we opt for local doctors only.”
(FGD 2, Male 8)
“We don’t have ready cash for any emergency. . . We are thankful to the village doctor who
give us credit for 6 months.”
(FGD5, Male1)
In addition to flexible payment, credit, and bartering, the simple cost of services was a bar-
rier to using FPs’ services:
Examination of health care provider choice in a developing economy
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“Here the money charged is also very less [sic]. Here we can complete the treatment in Rupees
200 and in city we have to start with doctor’s fees of at least Rupees 200 [author note, 80
rupees = US$1.00].”
(FGD 3, Male 6)
“We all think about this first. If we get good treatment by spending less money than that
would be best. Some doctors charge Rupees 500 for just touching the patient’s hand. If we have
two doctors and one is charging Rupees 50 and the other one is charging Rupees100 and both
of them are curing patients, then everyone would go to the cheap doctor only.”
(FGD 9, Male 1)
IPs provided low cost care and in addition offered a complete package–they provided
apparently free diagnosis and charged only for medications. In contrast to FPs, IPs readily
offered credit to their patients for consultation fees and medications. Sometimes, they even
accepted produce in lieu of payment. The seasonal nature of work for villagers, many of whom
relied on agriculture and farming, meant that they sometimes had little cash readily available
for healthcare. This was an advantage to IPs: their charges were low when compared to those
of FPs. Combined with the difficulty in reaching FPs and their cost, IPs seemed to be more
affordable to the participants. Cost was also linked to access and the location of FPs: going to a
city to access FPs could involve the additional expense for public transportation fare for at
least two people:
“It is nearly Rupees 30 by bus but if the patient is serious(ly ill) [sic]than we have to hire a
vehicle which would cost us around Rupees 800. So, people think it is better to get treated here
only.”
(FGD 9, Male 3)
In addition to actual transport costs, visiting a FP in the city could take all day, which added
the opportunity cost of lost time to affordability. A patient who went to a city for treatment not
only had to find a way to reach the city and locate a suitable doctor, but once she or he reached
the doctor’s office, had to wait in line, sometimes for several hours or even overnight, before
the doctor could see him/her. For FPs, in addition, payment was due before the consultation,
after which the patient had to pay for medicine at a pharmacy. The FP might also order labora-
tory investigations which require additional time before the treatment can begin. In contrast
to this, the IPs in the village were close by, see the patient quickly, and give medicine
immediately.
According to participants, patients escalated care-seeking to the next level–going to urban
centres to FPs–after first trying treatments from local IPs. They went to different urban centres
based on their perception of the doctors there, and sometimes also based on reference pro-
vided by the local IPs. Occasionally the local IPs even helped with transportation to urban cen-
tres to visit FPs when they (IPs) were not able to address the ailment.
“The first reason for not going to Ujjain is to save time. When will we go to Ujjain and come
back from there, it approximately takes 3 hours. In Ghosla we get immediate relief. We can
reach Ghosla in 20 minutes and they start giving treatment for the illness.
(FGD 4, Male1)
Examination of health care provider choice in a developing economy
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Trust and reputation, social and cultural factors trumped qualifications—
Except in emergencies
The respondents seemed to be aware of the qualifications that IPs had in comparison with FPs.
However, participants indicated that they generally chose to go to FPs in the urban areas only
after first trying treatment from local IPs.
“For big diseases like heart problem, complications in fever, motiabind (cataract), typhoid etc.
we go to Ujjain. If the local doctors are not able to treat, then only we go to Ujjain”
(FGD 6, Male 2)
Participants stated that emergencies were situations that resulted in a preference of FPs–an
important condition, potentially life threatening, warranted more skilled care. Therefore,
respondents reported at times going directly to the city, without trying IPs first.
Overall, word of mouth appeared to play a major role when selecting of specific IPs or FPs,
and when choosing between the two options. It seemed from the groups that while some peo-
ple were aware of the need for qualifications, others deliberately ignored the notion, and based
their choice of provider on trust and reputation alone.
According to the participants, an IP was usually also acquainted with the patient. Some
respondents did not even appear to be aware at all of the options available to them including
free charitable clinics, rather trusting those IPs that were known to them and their families.
Trust and familiarity therefore played an important role in the choice of treatment that
respondents sought out, closely related to social and cultural norms.
“Yes, even if a particular doctor doesn’t have a degree, if we have faith on his treatment, we
will go to him”
(FGD 8, Female 5)
As the participants had limited knowledge of the required treatment contents and stan-
dards, beyond what the providers themselves described, they perceived diagnostic procedures
initiated by FPs as a waste of time:
“Nowadays they charge Rupees 300 and nothing less than that for just examining you. After
that they would ask you to do many tests and to bring the report. Then only they would start
the treatment. In village we will go to the doctor and he will directly give you tablet, and injec-
tion and you would be fine.”
(FGD 2, Male 9)
However, when the medicine following a diagnostic procedure appeared to cure a patient,
participants reported that the patients and their families appreciated the use of the procedure.
In addition to trust and familiarity with a provider, the participants reported that the deci-
sion to consult a particular healthcare provider (IP or FP) was usually made for the entire
household by one family member, usually a patriarch.
“My husband only takes the decision to go to the doctor.”
(FGD 7, female 2)
“My grandfather decides for the family as he is the eldest in the family.”
(FGD 7, female 5)
Examination of health care provider choice in a developing economy
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Discussion
This study identified factors that contribute to patients’ decisions about selecting IPs or FPs in
rural areas in central India. We found that even after the implementation of the National Rural
Health Mission in 2005, the reasons for rural patients preferring IPs remain similar to the ones
identified in Rhode and Viswanathan’s [23] study, carried out nearly 25 years ago: the provi-
sion of fast, affordable treatment and flexible treatment options, and patients’ belief systems.
Our study also confirms that IPs continue as a notable source of health care for rural residents
[5,23–25]. A study of IPs in two districts in India reported that ‘doorstep’ services [5] were
offered by mobile IPs who travelled from house to house. Similarly, we observed that some IPs
provided house calls and also accompanied patients to formal health care providers when
needed, which increased peoples’ trust in them. Gautham et al. [5] found that IPs fill the
demand for primary curative care, which the public system does not satisfy, and are thus often
the de facto first-level access points; our results suggest that this phenomenon persists.
Across our FGDs, respondents noted that IPs play a pivotal role in providing health care
services and the first point of care in their villages. The NHM, deployed in 2005, had envi-
sioned trained accredited social health activists (ASHAs) to be the first contact point for
health-related demands in the communities [26]. However, according to our observations, the
first contact point remains the IPs. These IPs treat minor illnesses and, if they are unable to
treat an illness, also recommend formal doctors. We found that villagers’ preferences for utilis-
ing health care services were not static, but were case by case dependent on the accessibility,
affordability, and cultural acceptability of the provided services. Our findings also confirm the
results of a similar study in West Bengal, where the reasons for approaching IPs were proxim-
ity and round-the-clock availability [10]. Improving the public health system and to increase
use of FPs, therefore requires revising and amending the existing three-tier system [5] to
become more responsive to patient needs and preferences.
We found that most decisions to approach FPs or IPs were based on trust and familiarity.
People’s preferences were dictated by their cultural values and their trust in IPs is accompanied
by a distrust of the formal sector [10]. Respondents expressed general mistrust in government
hospitals and believed that connections with influential people were necessary to be well
treated there. There is some evidence that a lack of investment in rural health service infra-
structure in India has eroded patient trust in formal health services [27]. Trust is one of the
most important components for providing effective health care services [27], and lack of such
trust can act as an access barrier [28]. In India, the erosion of trust in the formal public health
system may have led people to visit IPs, reducing adherence to proven treatment and care, and
thus compromising the quality of care [27]. The level of mistrust is greater among the under-
privileged in India, who continue to have limited choice and no voice [27].
Many of the respondents using IPs were aware of IPs’ limited qualifications. However, our
findings indicate that word of mouth played a larger role than qualifications when choosing
service providers. This is unsurprising, as often a familiar or recommended provider is deemed
more trustworthy and is thus consulted first for any health care need. Such familiarity is also
instrumental in IPs being able to extend credit terms to patients. IPs have also adapted their
health care services in line with local peoples’ needs, preferences, and economic power. This is
similar to a description of access provided by Penchansky and Thomas [29], who stated ‘the
degree of fit between the consumer and the service; the better the fit, the better the access’ [30].
Our findings suggest that IPs develop close relationships with families, and build their reputa-
tions among rural communities, making them the preferred choice over formal providers. IPs
respect patients’ social contexts and living conditions. The villagers know them well, and their
past successes create a perception of trustworthiness and dependability [31].
Examination of health care provider choice in a developing economy
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220316 August 1, 2019 8 / 12
Most villages are not well connected to urban population centres where qualified doctors
practice health care, and access to both public and private health care sectors remains poor. It
is critical for UHC to ensure equitable distribution of health services with one of the key levers
being filling the physical and infrastructure gap [9]. Although indirect costs such as transporta-
tion are not part of UHC, strengthening the public system prioritizing the peoples’ needs is
key [3,9]. As the cost of transport is an access driver, local IPs fill the gap. Sometimes, transport
costs are more than the fees paid to the FP. Hence, although an indirect cost, transport greatly
influences the rural population’s health care choices [10].
The public health community is gradually recognising the IPs’ importance [7] but medical
associations in India continue to discourage their inclusion in the formal health care system
[32]. Most Indian medical establishments view IPs as dangerous ‘quacks’, and courts have
ordered the government to shut down IPs’ operations [33]. These issues need to be resolved if
UHC is to be achieved in rural India. A randomised controlled trial training IPs showed a
modest rise of 7.9 [CI: 0.4, 15.5] percentage points in correct case management, but little
impact on correct medicine prescription [13]. Therefore, complementary interventions
including regular monitoring and supervision and changes in financial and non-financial
incentives to encourage good practice by IPs could be included. Additional demand-side mea-
sures may include public education to reduce information asymmetries between providers
and patients and measures to increase awareness of rational drug usage [34]. Affordability,
access, and awareness, along with socio-cultural factors and trust need to be addressed by the
formal healthcare sector to ensure universal access to care.
Methodological considerations
We used a multidisciplinary perspective, including public health, social science, and business
process management researchers. The FGDs gave detailed insights into how rural patients
choose between IPs and FPs. We included participants of different gender and from different
societal strata, unfortunately fewer women than men responded to our invitation. Our results’
generalisability is limited to areas with similar conditions. Our study is also limited by not
including IPs themselves, which is important in future research.
Conclusion
Our study found that patients decide their provider based on trust, reputation, and affordability,
balancing carefully their symptoms with available providers. To expand access to healthcare in
these villages, patients need health care services to offer flexible hours, to be close and readily
available, and to combine consultations for diagnoses with the dispensing of medications, as
well as decreasing the cost of healthcare or providing health insurance for the village popula-
tion. It is important to note that improving the public health system for rural populations and
achieving universal health coverage calls for more than just tackling the shortage of qualified
doctors or FPs, and may include involving the large numbers of trusted informal providers.
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Appendix A: Subset of Questions used to guide focus group discussions
1. Within the past three months, how many times did someone in your household have to
seek medical treatment?
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2. Who was the treatment for?
3. Who did you visit for treatment?
4. How are you paying (do you plan to pay) for this treatment?
5. Do you always go to this provider?
6. Did anyone (who–relative, another provider. . .) refer you to this provider?
7. Do any of the following factors influence your choice of provider? If yes, how?
a. Distance
b. Relative cost
c. Availability of provider
d. Nature of the ailment (some categorization of chronic vs. acute vs. . . .)
e. Or for immunization, preventive, accident related, surgical procedure,
f. Competence of the provider
g. Interpersonal skills of the provider
h. Patients’ and/or families’ ability to follow provider instructions
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Gopesh Anand, Dilip Chhajed, Vishal Diwan.
Data curation: Dilip Chhajed, Vishal Diwan.
Formal analysis: Gopesh Anand, Shailja Shah, Salla Atkins, Vishal Diwan.
Methodology: Gopesh Anand, Dilip Chhajed, Salla Atkins, Vishal Diwan.
Project administration: Vishal Diwan.
Resources: Vishal Diwan.
Supervision: Vishal Diwan.
Visualization: Shailja Shah.
Writing – original draft: Vishal Diwan.
Writing – review & editing: Gopesh Anand, Dilip Chhajed, Shailja Shah, Salla Atkins, Vishal
Diwan.
References
1. Gupta A, Lohiya A, Reddy VB. India Strive to Provide Universal Health Coverage. Journal of Pharmacy
Practice and Community Medicine 2017; 3(3):92–6.
2. United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. United Nations. 2015. https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300. Cited 1 December 2018
3. Sumit G. Universal health cover for India. Evolving a framework for healthcare reimbursement method-
ologies. FICCI Health Services 2013 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0f23/
91f7492a1966422ba26fead0cf1b531892c8.pdf. Cited March 28, 2019.
4. Bajpai N, Sachs J, Dholakia RH. Improving access and efficiency in public health services: mid-term
evaluation of India’s national rural health mission. SAGE; 2010. 117 p.
Examination of health care provider choice in a developing economy
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220316 August 1, 2019 10 / 12
5. Gautham M, Binnendijk E, Koren R, Dror DM. “First we go to the small doctor”: first contact for curative
health care sought by rural communities in Andhra Pradesh & Orissa, India. Indian J Med Res. 2011
Nov; 134(5):627–38. https://doi.org/10.4103/0971-5916.90987 PMID: 22199101
6. Yadav K, Jarhyan P, Gupta V, Pandav CS. Revitalizing Rural Health Care Delivery: Can Rural Health
Practitioners be the Answer? Indian J Community Med. 2009 Jan; 34(1):3–5. https://doi.org/10.4103/
0970-0218.45368 PMID: 19876447
7. Ranga V, Panda P. Private non-degree practitioners and spatial access to out-patient care in rural
India. GeoJournal. 2015; 81(2):267–280
8. Mor N, Kalita A. Missing links in universal health care. The Hindu 21 Nov 2014. https://www.thehindu.
com/opinion/lead/missing-links-in-universal-health-care/article6618667.ece Cited 28 March 2019
9. Sengupta A. Universal health carein India Making it public, making it a reality.2013. municipalservice-
sproject. Occasional Paper No. 19. https://www.municipalservicesproject.org/sites/
municipalservicesproject.org/files/publications/Sengupta_Universal_Health_Care_in_India_Making_it_
Public_May2013.pdf. Cited June 2 2019.
10. Sudhinaraset M, Ingram M, Lofthouse HK, Montagu D. What Is the Role of Informal Healthcare Provid-
ers in Developing Countries? A Systematic Review. PLoS One. 2013; 8(2).
11. Banerjee A, Deaton A, Duflo E. Health Care Delivery in rural Rajasthan. Economic and Polital Weekely.
2004; 39 (9):944–949.
12. Rao PH. Profile and practice of private medical practitioner in rural India. Health and Population-Per-
spectives and issues. 2005; 28 (1):40–49
13. Das J, Chowdhury A, Hussam R, Banerjee AV. The impact of training informal health care providers in
India: A randomized controlled trial. Science. 2016; 354(6308):7384-1-11
14. Das J, Mohpal A. Socioeconomic status and quality of Care in rural India: New evidence from provider
and household surveys. Health Affairs. 2016 Oct; 35(10):1764–73. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.
0558 PMID: 27702947
15. Cross J, MacGregor H. Who Are ‘Informal Health Providers’ and What Do They Do? Perspectives from
Medical Anthropology. IDS Work Pap. 2009 Sep; 2009(334):01–23. Available from: https://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2009.00334_2.x. Cited 1 June 2019
16. Kohnke EJ, Mukherjee UK, Sinha KK. Delivering long-term surgical care in underserved communities:
The enabling role of International NPOs as partners. Prod Oper Manag. 2017 Jun; 26(6):1092–119.
17. Primary Census Abstract: Madhya Pradesh. Government of India. 2011. https://data.gov.in/resources/
primary-census-abstract-2011-madhya-pradesh. Cited March 29 2019.
18. UNDP. Work for Human Development. 2015. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_
development_report.pdf. Cited March 29 2019.
19. Natonal Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. Potential Linked Plan. 2016–17. 2016 https://
www.nabard.org/demo/auth/writereaddata/tender/2210162338UJJAIN%20-2016-17.split-and-merged.
pdf. Cited May 29 2019.
20. District Fact Sheet Ujjain Madhya Pradesh 2015–16. National Family Health Survey- 4. http://rchiips.
org/NFHS/FCTS/MP/MP_FactSheet_435_Ujjain.pdf. Cited March 29 2019.
21. Annual Health Survey Bulletin 2012–2013: Madhya Pradesh 2013. Ministry of Home Affairs. Govern-
ment of India, New Delhi. http://www.censusindia.gov.in/vital_statistics/AHSBulletins/AHS_
Factsheets_2012-13/FACTSHEET-MP.pdf. Cited May 29 2019.
22. Ritchie J, Spencer L, Spencer L. Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research. Taylor and Fran-
cis. 2002 Sep;187–208.
23. Rohde J, Viswanathan H. The rural private practitioner. Health Millions. 1994 Feb; 2(1):13–6. PMID:
12288589
24. George A, Iyer A. Unfree markets: Socially embedded informal health providers in northern Karnataka,
India. Soc Sci Med. 2013 Nov; 96:297–304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.022 PMID:
23484865
25. Das J, Holla A, Das V, Mohanan M, Tabak D, Chan B. In Urban and Rural India, A Standardized patient
study showed low levels of provider training and huge quality gaps. Health Affairs. 2012 Dec; 31
(12):2774–84. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2011.1356 PMID: 23213162
26. May C, Roth K, Panda P. Non-degree allopathic practitioners as first contact points for acute illness epi-
sodes: insights from a qualitative study in rural northern India. BMC Health Serv Res. 2014 Dec; 14
(1):182.
27. Kane S, Calnan M, Radkar A. Trust and trust relations from the providers’ perspective: the case of the
healthcare system in India. Indian J Med Ethics. 2015; 12 (2):157–68.
Examination of health care provider choice in a developing economy
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220316 August 1, 2019 11 / 12
28. Russell S. Treatment-seeking behaviour in urban Sri Lanka: Trusting the state, trusting private provid-
ers. Soc Sci Med. 2005 Oct; 61(7):1396–407. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.11.077 PMID:
16005775
29. Penchansky R, Thomas JW. The concept of access: Definition and relationship to consumer satisfac-
tion. Med Care. 1981; 19 (2):127–40. PMID: 7206846
30. Saurman E. Improving access: modifying Penchansky and Thomas’s Theory of Access. J Health Serv
Res Policy. 2016 Jan; 21(1):36–9. https://doi.org/10.1177/1355819615600001 PMID: 26377728
31. Sieverding M, Beyeler N. Integrating informal providers into a people-centered health systems
approach: qualitative evidence from local health systems in rural Nigeria. BMC Health Serv Res. 2016;
16:526 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-016-1780-0 PMID: 27687854
32. Pulla P. Here’s why ‘quacks’ in India are being trained to practise real medicine. Scroll.in 2015. https://
scroll.in/article/766148/heres-why-quacks-in-india-are-being-trained-to-practise-real-medicine. Cited
May 28 2019
33. Express. 2012. Take action against ‘quacks’, HC reiterates. The Indian Express May 17, 2012. Allaha-
bad, Uttar Pradesh. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/take-action-against-quacks-hc-reiterates/
950424 Cited 28 April 2019.
34. Gautham M, Shyamprasad KM, Singh R, Zachariah A, Singh R, Bloom G. Informal rural healthcare pro-
viders in North and South India. Health Policy Plan. 2014; 29(SUPPL. 1):20–9.
Examination of health care provider choice in a developing economy
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220316 August 1, 2019 12 / 12
